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 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REPUTATION AND DEBTt
 Sudden Stops and Output Drops
 By V. V. CHARI, PATRICK J. KEHOE, AND ELLEN R. MCGRATTAN*
 Recent financial crises in emerging markets
 have included two features: abrupt declines in
 capital inflows, commonly known as sudden
 stops (Guillermo Calvo, 1998), and large de-
 clines in output. Here we ask whether theory
 predicts that these two features are related: do
 sudden stops necessarily lead to output drops?
 We ask this in a standard equilibrium model in
 which sudden stops are generated by an abrupt
 tightening of a country's collateral constraint on
 foreign borrowing. Theory's answer is no; sud-
 den stops, by themselves, do not lead to decreases
 in output, but rather to increases. To generate an
 output drop during a financial crisis, the model
 must include other frictions which have negative
 effects on output that are large enough to over-
 whelm the positive effect of the sudden stop.
 We begin by setting up a standard model of a
 small open economy in which foreign borrowing
 is subject to a collateral constraint. We view fluc-
 tuations in this collateral constraint as arising from
 fluctuations in a country's reputation. In the
 model, the country's budget constraint implies
 that an abrupt decrease in capital inflows produces
 an abrupt increase in net exports. Following our
 earlier approach (in Chari et al., 2004), we show
 that the equilibrium outcomes in the small open
 economy are equivalent to those of a closed-
 economy prototype growth model of the kind
 widely used in the business-cycle literature. In
 particular, we show that a rise in net exports in the
 small open economy corresponds to a rise in gov-
 ernment consumption in the prototype model. It is
 well known that an increase in government con-
 sumption produces an increase in output in models
 like our prototype growth model. A sudden stop
 that produces an increase in net exports in the
 small open economy thus also leads to an increase
 in output. We demonstrate this quantitatively with
 data from Mexico in the mid-1990s.
 In three other studies, researchers have built
 small open-economy business-cycle models in
 which sudden stops lead to output drops. In
 these studies, however, output drops because of
 other frictions that overwhelm the direct effect
 on output from sudden stops. In all three stud-
 ies, firms must borrow in advance to pay for
 inputs to production. In Pablo Neumeyer and
 Fabrizio Perri (2004), firms must borrow to pay
 for a fraction of the wage bill, while in Law-
 rence Christiano et al. (2004) and Enrique Men-
 doza (2004), firms must borrow to pay for
 foreign intermediate inputs. This payment-in-
 advance requirement, by itself, does not intro-
 duce a friction because firms can simply borrow
 at the market interest rate to make the payments.
 In Neumeyer and Perri (2004) and Mendoza
 (2004), the key friction is that firms are effec-
 tively required to put the funds in a non-interest-
 bearing escrow account. In Neumeyer and Perri,
 this requirement introduces a wedge between
 the marginal product of labor and the marginal
 rate of substitution between leisure and con-
 sumption. In Mendoza, this requirement pro-
 duces a shock to total factor productivity. In
 Christiano et al. (2004) the payment-in-advance
 requirement interacts with the collateral con-
 straint to produce a shock to total factor pro-
 ductivity. Here we demonstrate in a version of
 our model that the output drops in these studies
 are not due to the sudden stops alone.
 I. Collateral Constraints
 Here we develop a model with a collateral
 constraint facing a small open economy. We show
 t Discussants: Andrew Atkeson, University of Califor-
 nia; Olivier Jeanne, International Monetary Fund; Manuel
 Amador, Stanford University.
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 National Science Foundation for its support and Kathy
 Rolfe for excellent editorial assistance. Any views ex-
 pressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily
 those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the
 Federal Reserve System.
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 that equilibrium allocations in this original model
 coincide with those in a closed-economy proto-
 type growth model with shocks to government
 consumption. Specifically, a decline in net exports
 resulting from a tightening of the collateral con-
 straint corresponds to a rise in government con-
 sumption in the prototype growth model.
 A. Original Economy
 Consider the following model of a small open
 economy embedded in a world economy with a
 single homogeneous good in each period. The
 economy experiences one of finitely many
 events s,, which index the shocks. We denote by
 st = (so, ... , st) the history of events up through
 and including period t. The probability, as of
 period 0, of any particular history s' is 7T(st). The
 initial realization so is given.
 The representative consumer in this economy
 has preferences
 (1) 1> 6'tr(s')U(c(s'), l(st))
 where c(st) and 1(s') denote consumption and
 labor. The country's budget constraint is
 (2) c(st) + b(st) + k(st) < F(k(s'- '),
 1(st)) + (1 - 8)k(s'-') + q(s' ')b(st+1)
 ,+ 'Ist
 where b(s+ 1) denotes the amount of state-
 contingent debt, or borrowing from the rest of
 the world by the country in period t, q(st+ 1)
 denotes the corresponding state-contingent
 price, and k(st) denotes the capital stock cho-
 sen in period t for use in period t + 1. The
 country faces a collateral constraint on bor-
 rowing of
 (3) b(s't') V(s,+1,)
 where the maximal amount of borrowing
 V(st+ 0) depends on the shock in period t + 1.
 To avoid Ponzi schemes, we assume that
 V(st+ 1) is uniformly bounded above. The con-
 straint (3) implies that having more collateral
 allows the country to borrow more. We interpret
 shocks to this collateral constraint as arising
 from changes in the relationship between the
 country and international financial markets (or
 the country's financial reputation).
 The government of this country maxim zes
 the utility of the representative consumer (1)
 subject o the country's budget c nstraint (2)
 and collateral constraint (3). The world gross
 interest rate is constant and equal to R across
 both states and time. Arbitrage requires that, in
 equilibrium,
 (4) q(st + ) = R R
 An equilibrium for the rigina  economy is a set
 of allocations [c(st), k(st), l(s'), b(st+ 1)] and
 prices [q(s')] such that these allocations solve
 the government's problem and the prices satisfy
 the arbitrage condition (4).
 In this economy, a sudden stop is defined as
 an abrupt increase in net exports. Here, net
 export  are clearly F(k(st- 1), l(s')) - [k(st) -
 (1 - 8)k(st-1)] - c(st), which from (2) equals
 (5) b(s') - q(s' ')b(s,+').
 st + ist
 Thus, a sudden stop is equivalently defined as
 an abrupt decrease in new borrowing. From (3),
 we know that a sudden drop in V(st+ 1) leads to
 a drop in b(s'+ 1) and, when the collateral con-
 straint is binding, to a sudden stop.
 To understand how the collateral constraint
 affects the equilibrium, consider the first-order
 conditions of the government's problem. Let
 Pt+ l.t(St+ l)(st+ 1) be the multiplier on the
 collateral constraint, so that g(s' ) is positive
 when the collateral constraint is binding and
 zero when it is not. Then the first-order condi-
 tions imply that
 Ul (S') (6) Uc-(s) = FI(st) U, (St)
 (7) Uc (s')
 S1 P Ts"lst)Uc(s")[Fk(St+1)
 s+'lIst
 and
 (8) Uc(s')= OR[U,(st+') IL(st'+1)]
 Notice that the collateral constraint does not
 distort either the first-order condition (6),
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 governing labor supply, or the intertemporal
 Euler equation (7), governing capital accumu-
 lation. As can be seen from (8), the collat-
 eral constraint affects only the inter-
 temporal marginal rate of substitution in
 consumption.
 B. Associated Prototype Economy
 Now consider a closed-economy prototype
 model with an exogenous stochastic variable,
 government consumption g(st), which we call
 the government consumption wedge. In this
 economy, consumers maximize (1) subject to
 the following budget constraint:
 (9) c(s') + k(s') < w(st)l(s')
 + [r(st) + 1 - 6]k(s-' 1) + T(s')
 where w(st), r(st), and T(st) are the wage rate,
 the capital rental rate, and the lump-sum trans-
 fers. In each state s', firms choose k and 1 to
 maximize F(k, 1) - r(st)k - w(st)l. The gov-
 ernment's budget constraint is
 (10) g(s') + T(s') = 0.
 The resource constraint for this economy is
 (11) c(st) + g(st) + k(st)
 = F(k(st- 1), l(s')) + (1 - 3)k(st-').
 An equilibrium of the prototype economy con-
 sists of allocations [c(st), k(st), l(st), g(st), T(st)]
 and prices [w(st), r(s')] such that these alloca-
 tions are optimal for consumers and firms and
 the resource constraint is satisfied.
 The following proposition shows that the
 government consumption wedge in the proto-
 type economy consists of net exports in the
 original economy:
 PROPOSITION 1: Consider an equilibrium of
 (c(st), k(st), l(s'), b(st+')) and (q(st)) for the
 original economy. Let the government con-
 sumption wedge be
 (12) g(st) = F(k(st' ), (st))
 - [k(s') - (1 - 6)k(s'-')] - c(s')
 let t e wage and capital rental rates be w(st) =
 FI(st) and r(st) = Fk(st), and let the lump-sum
 transfers T(st) be defined by (10). Then the
 allocations (c(st), k(st), l(st), g(st), T(st)) and the
 prices (w(st), r(st)) are an equilibrium for the
 prototype economy.
 PROOF:
 The first-order conditions for the prototype
 economy are (6) and (7). Under the construction
 of the government consumption wedge in (12),
 the resource constraint (11) is equal to (2). The
 proposition then follows.
 Now consider a sudden stop, as in the origi-
 nal economy. In the prototype economy, this
 sudden stop manifests itself as an abrupt in-
 crease in the government consumption wedge.
 As is well known from the business-cycle liter-
 ature, an increase in government consumption
 by itself leads to an increase in labor and an
 increase in output (see e.g., S. Rao Aiyagari et
 al., 1992). Thus, in this economy, a sudden stop
 does not generate an output drop; it generates an
 output rise.
 Note that for simplicity we have abstracted
 from any government consumption in the orig-
 inal economy. If we let the original economy
 have government consumption, then the gov-
 ernment consumption wedge in the prototype
 economy is the sum of government consump-
 tion and net exports in the original economy.
 Note also that given an equilibrium in the
 prototype economy, we can construct the asso-
 ciated equilibrium in the original economy if
 Uc(s')/I3R - Uc(s'+ 1) is nonnegative for all st+ 1 for some choice of R > 1. This R serves as the
 world interest r te in the original economy, and
 at such an R, the multiplier on the collateral
 constraint is nonnegative. In this constructed
 equilibrium, the value of the initial debt in the
 original economy is set equal to the present
 discounted value of government consumption in
 the prototype economy. The debt in the original
 economy at state s' is, of course, the present
 discounted value of net exports and, hence, in
 the prototype economy corresponds to the
 present discounted value of future government
 consumption.
 Proposition 1 is closely related to a proposi-
 tion in our earlier work (Chari et al., 2004). In
 that proposition, we consider an original econ-
 omy with no collateral constraint but with a
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 fluctuating world interest rate. We establish a
 similar equivalence proposition there. In the
 original economy, fluctuations in the world in-
 terest rate lead to fluctuations in net exports. In
 the prototype economy, these fluctuations in net
 exports show up as fluctuations in the govern-
 ment consumption wedge.
 C. Extensions to Uncontingent Asset Markets
 Consider now a version of the original econ-
 omy in which we replace the state-contingent
 debt with uncontingent debt. Here the budget
 constraint becomes
 (13) c(s') + b(s'-') + k(st) F(k(s-'),
 l(st)) + (1 - 6)k(st - 1) + q(st)b(st)
 where now b(st) denotes the amount of state-
 uncontingent debt owed to the rest of the world
 by the country in period t and q(s') denotes the
 corresponding price. The collateral constraint
 then becomes
 (14) b(s') 5 V(s,+ I) for all st+ 1.
 Here q(s') = 1/R. The first-order conditions
 associated with the problem are (6), (7), and
 Uc (s')
 = O3R rT(st+ 1st')[Uc(s't+) + p(st+ )].
 st + I st
 With this setup, the analogue of Proposition 1
 immediately applies. In particular, in the proto-
 type economy, fluctuations in the government
 consumption wedge play the same role as fluc-
 tuations in net exports in the original economy.
 II. A Quantitative Analysis of a Sudden Stop
 Here we use the logic of Proposition 1 to
 examine the quantitative effects of a well-
 known sudden stop episode, in Mexico in the
 mid-1990s.
 In Figure 1, we plot Mexican data on real net
 exports and the government consumption
 wedge (the sum of real government consump-
 tion and real net exports) between the last quar-
 ters of 1994 and 1996. We normalize both series
 by the level of real GDP in 1994:4. The figure
 20
 The Government Con umptio  Wedge
 S10
 Mexican Net Exports
 -Io
 1994:4 1995:1 1995:2 1995:3 1995:4 1996:1 1996:2 1996:3 1996:4
 FIGURE 1. THE MEXICAN SUDDEN STOP IN 1994:4
 Notes: Government Consumption Wedge = real govern-
 ment consumption plus real exports less real imports, all
 divided by the population aged 15-64. Mexican Net Ex-
 ports = real exports less real imports, divided by the pop-
 ulation aged 15-64. Both series have been normalized by
 first dividing by real GDP in 1994:4 and then multiplying
 by 100. The quarterly data have been seasonally adjusted
 by the authors. (Codes and data are available at (http://
 minneapolisfed.org/research/sr).)
 Sources of basic data: Organisation for Economic
 Co-operation and Development, World Development
 Indicators.
 shows an abrupt and dramatic increase in the
 government consumption wedge in the first
 quarter of 1995 and suggests that this increase
 was due almost entirely to the sharp rise in net
 exports. That is, Mexico experienced a sudden
 stop.
 We study the quantitative effects of this sud-
 den stop in a prototype growth model. We use a
 version of the model in Chari et al. (2004), in
 which the stochastic processes for the govern-
 ment consumption wedge, the labor wedge, the
 efficiency wedge, and the investment wedge are
 estimated using the model and Mexican data
 from 1980:1 to 2003:4. (For details, see Chari et
 al. [2005].)
 To assess the effects of the sudden stop, we
 feed the realized values of the Mexican govern-
 ment consumption wedge over the period from
 1994:4 to 1996:4 into our prototype growth
 model, holding the values of the other Mexican
 wedges fixed at their 1994:4 levels. Figure 2
 shows the result: given that historical Mexican
 data, the model predicts that the sudden stop, by
 itself, leads to a small increase in output. Fig-
 ure 2 also shows what actually happened to
 Mexican real GDP in 1995: it fell sharply. This
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 105 1 , 1 1 , I ,
 100x) Model Output From a Sudden Stop
 95
 90-Mexician Real GDP
 85994:4 1995:1 15: 5: 1995:4 996:1 1996: 996:3 1996:4
 1M:4 1995:1 1995:211995:3 1995:4 1996:1 1996:2 1996:3 1996:4
 FIGURE 2. THE OUTPUT EFFECT OF A SUDDEN STOP ALONE
 Notes: Mexican Real GDP = real GDP divided by the
 population aged 15-64. Model Output from a Sudden
 Stop = the predicted output response assuming the only
 shock in the prototype growth model is the shock to gov-
 ernment consumption. Realizations of this shock are con-
 sistent with Mexican data. Both series have been normalized
 so that the value in 1994:4 is 100. The quarterly data have
 been seasonally adjusted by the authors. (Codes and data are
 available at (http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr).)
 Sources of basic data: Organisation for Economic Co-
 operation and Development, World Development Indica-
 tors, International Labor Organization, Penn World Tables.
 analysis clearly demonstrates that the sharp out-
 put drop is not due to the sudden stop alone.
 III. Other Frictions
 We have shown that in our simple model with
 a collateral constraint on foreign borrowing,
 sudden stops do not lead to output drops. Now
 we consider adding other frictions to the simple
 model and ask if sudden stops, interacting with
 these frictions, lead to output drops. We first
 consider an economy with an endogenous col-
 lateral constraint and show that this constraint
 corresponds to a subsidy to investment in the
 prototype growth model and, therefore, to an
 increase in output. We then consider the role of
 an advance-payment constraint. We show that
 such a constraint can lead to output drops from
 sudden stops only when coupled with yet other
 frictions.
 A. Investment Wedges from Endogenous
 Collateral Constraints
 Consider a version of the original economy
 with one change, that the collateral constraint
 (3) is replaced by an endogenous collateral
 constraint:
 (15) b(st +') < V(k(s'), st,,,).
 Here the maximal amount that can be borrowed,
 V(k(s'), s,+ 1), depends on the capital stock cho-
 sen in period t and the shock in period t + 1. We
 assume that V(k(st), st+1) is strictly increasing
 in k, so that having more collateral allows a
 country to borrow more, and that V(k(st), st + 1)
 is uniformly bounded above, to avoid Ponzi
 schemes. This formulation is similar to that of
 Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997) and
 is motivated by the idea that a portion of the
 capital stock can effectively be seized by for-
 eign lenders in the event of default; hence,
 foreign lenders will not lend more than the
 value of the seizable portion.
 An equilibrium in this endogenous collateral-
 constraint economy is defined as before. The
 first-order conditions here are the same as in the
 original economy except that the intertemporal
 Euler equation (7) is replaced by
 (16) U, (st)
 = '7r(s't+ls)Uc(s' ')[(Fk(st+')- ) + 1]
 St + I 5st
 + , P T(S" 't);L((S'+ ')Vk(St+l)1
 St + lIst
 The associated prototype economy has an
 investment wedge 1 - 7(st), resembling a tax on capital income, along with the government
 consumption wedge. The consumers' budget
 constraint is now
 (17) c(s') + k(st) - w(s')l(st)
 + [(1 - k(st))(r(s) - 8) + 1]k(st-') + T(st).
 The government's budget constraint is now
 (18) g(st) + T(st) = k(s)(r(st) - 8)k(st-1)
 and the resource constraint is unaffected. An
 equilibrium of the prototype economy is defined
 as before.
 The following proposition shows that the en-
 dogenous collateral constraint manifests itself
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 as an investment wedge in the associated pro-
 totype economy:
 PROPOSITION 2: Consider an equilibrium
 for the endogenous collateral-constraint econ-
 omy. Let the investment wedge be
 T(st+ l) Vk (St + l)
 Uc(S'+ 1)(Fk(St+1)_ ' )
 let T(st) be defined by (18), and let the rest of the
 variables be as in Proposition 1. Then the result-
 ing allocations, prices, and wedges are an equi-
 librium for the associated prototype economy.
 The proof of the proposition follows imme-
 diately from a comparison of the first-order
 conditions, budget constraints, and resource
 constraints of the two economies.
 Note that if the endogenous collateral-
 constraint economy is in the neighborhood of
 a steady state, then Fk(St+ 1) -_ is positive,
 so that in this neighborhood, a binding col-
 lateral constraint [ji(st+ 1) > 0] corresponds
 to a subsidy to capital accumulation
 [Tk(st+ 1) < 0]. The intuition for this result is
 that if the collateral constraint in the original
 economy is binding in period t + 1, then
 capital accumulation in period t helps to relax
 the collateral constraint in period t + 1 and,
 hence, provides an additional benefit beyond
 that from the marginal product of capital.
 Consider a sudden stop in the endogenous
 collateral-constraint economy generated by a
 tightening of the collateral constraint. Proposi-
 tion 2 shows that such a sudden stop corre-
 sponds to a subsidy to capital accumulation
 along with an increase in government consump-
 tion. A well-known result in the business-cycle
 literature is that a subsidy to capital accumula-
 tion stimulates investment and output. We have
 already argued that an increase in government
 consumption also stimulates output. Thus, in
 the endogenous collateral-constraint economy,
 sudden stops do not lead to output drops.
 B. Labor and Efficiency Wedges from an
 Advance-Payment Constraint
 The literature on sudden stops has introduced
 various forms of constraints involving pay-
 ments in advance and has shown that sudden
 stops interacting with these constraints and
 other frictions can produce output drops. Neu-
 meyer and Perri (2004) introduce advance-
 payment constraints on wages, together with an
 escrow provision, and Christiano et al. (2004)
 and Mendoza (2004) introduce them on pay-
 ments of intermediate goods. Christiano et al.
 subject these payments to collateral constraints.
 Mendoza has both an escrow provision and a
 collateral constraint. Here we introduce an
 advance-payment constraint on wages and show
 that alone it does not produce simultaneous
 sudden stops and output drops.
 In the business-cycle literature, it has been
 widely argued that requiring firms to pay work-
 ers in advance of production introduces a wedge
 between the marginal product of labor and the
 marginal rate of substitution between leisure
 and consumption; we have called this a labor
 wedge (Chari et al., 2004). Here we argue that
 such a requirement, by itself, does not introduce
 a labor wedge, but it does so when coupled with
 a requirement that firms escrow future wages in
 non-interest-bearing accounts.
 Consider the following deterministic version
 of our economy with an advance-payment
 constraint together with an escrow provision. In
 this economy, in period t - 1, a firm must
 escrow with the government its wage bill wtlt
 due in period t. To do so, the firm borrows
 wl, at t - 1 from foreign lenders at the world
 (gross) interest rate R, and escrows these funds
 with the government. (Note that the firm's cash
 flows in period t - 1 with respect to these
 transactions net out to zero.) In period t, the firm
 uses the escrowed funds to pay its workers,
 and it must repay the foreign lenders Rtw,l,.
 The firm's problem is to maximize profits at t
 given by
 F(kt, lt) - Rtwtl, - rtkt.
 The government rebates the interest on es-
 crowed funds as a lump-sum transfer to con-
 sumers. Consumers maximize utility I3tU(c,,
 1,) subject to the following budget constraint:
 c,+ R,b, + k, t wlt
 + [rt + (1 - 8)]k, + bt+1 + T,.
 The resulting first-order conditions imply that
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 Ult FI,
 U,- Rt
 This economy is equivalent to a prototype econ-
 omy with tax rate on labor Ti, equal to 1 -
 (1/R,). The advance-payment constraint with an
 escrow provision induces a labor wedge of 1 -
 TI = 1/Rt.
 To see that an advance-payment constraint,
 by itself, does not introduce a labor wedge, let
 the government pay interest on the escrow ac-
 counts at rate R,. Here the firms borrow wtlR, at
 t - 1, their problem is to maximize F(kt, l,) -
 wt1, - rtk,, and there is no labor wedge.
 It is easy to show that an advance-payment
 constraint on intermediate goods, by itself, does
 not distort decisions. When coupled with other
 frictions, such as subjecting advance payments
 to collateral constraints, these constraints on
 intermediate goods manifest themselves as ef-
 ficiency wedges that resemble shocks to total
 factor productivity.
 IV. Conclusion
 We have shown theoretically and empirically
 that in standard equilibrium models, sudden
 stops of capital inflows lead to increases, not
 drops, in output. The key frictions that generate
 output drops in the existing literature on sudden
 stops are subtle ones for which so far there is
 little direct evidence. Finding that evidence is a
 challenge for future research.
 Another challenge for future research is to
 explore a quite different view, one which, in
 fact, reverses the causation from that in the
 sudden stop literature. In this alternative view,
 private agents see events that lead them to pre-
 dict future drops in a country's output, and as a
 result, these agents pull their capital from the
 country. In this view, in other words, antici-
 pated output drops drive the sudden stops,
 rather than the reverse. While this view may
 seem reasonable, whether quantitative evidence
 can be found to support it is an open issue. (For
 some preliminary work on this view, see Mark
 Aguiar and Gita Gopinath [2005].)
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